

BASIC PARAMETERS, MANIFESTATIONS AND OPTIONS OF CONCEPTUALIZATION AND PRACTICE OF POPULISM IN THE WORLD AT THE END OF THE 20th CENTURY

The article analyzes the supporting parameters, manifestations and options of conceptualization and practice of populism in the world, in particular in its various parts and in general, in the second half and at the end of the 20th century. The author states that populism began to diversify, but at the same time to be theorized and to acquire doctrinal outlines since the middle of the 20th century. The manifestation of this was that the conceptualization and empiricism of populism began to acquire signs of tendentious and recurring processes. Given these, the essence of populism in the dynamics of the second half of the 20th century is analyzed on the example of Europe as well as North and South America and so on. On this basis, it is argued that the understanding of populism has not become consolidated, unified and unilateral one in the second half – in the late 20th century. Firstly, populism can be a characteristic of both democratic and non-democratic (hybrid and autocratic ones) political regimes that determines its different orientation and vector. Secondly, populism can be perceived as both a negative and a positive socio-political phenomenon, although classically it is typically supposed to be a threat to democracy. Thirdly, populism depends in its interpretation not only on the part of the world, but also on the country, and therefore it should always be considered contextually. Fourthly, populism can be caused by very different reasons, but socio-economic factors are less frequently its causes than political factors. However, populism in the second half of the 20th century generally began to be doctrinalized and typologized based on a combination of several basic parameters and criteria that are traditionally reduced to confrontation and mobilization of the struggle between the “people” and the “oligarchy”/“elite”.

Keywords: politics, democracy, populism, political discourse, power, people, elite, party, political process.

Podstawowe parametry, wyglądy i możliwości konceptualizacji i praktyki populizmu na świecie w końcu XX wieku

Artykuł analizuje główne parametry, przejawy i opcje konceptualizacji i praktyki populizmu na świecie, w szczególności w różnych jego częściach i w ogóle w drugiej połowie – pod koniec XX wieku. Ustalono, że populizm zaczął się różnicować od połowy XX wieku, ale jednocześnie teoretyzować i przyswajając zarysy doktrynalne. Przejawem tego był fakt, że konceptualizacja i empiryzm populizmu zaczął nabierać oznak tendencji i powtarzalności. Biorąc to pod uwagę,

istotę populizmu w dynamice drugiej połowy XX wieku analizowano na przykładzie krajów Europy, Ameryki Północnej i Południowej itp. Na tej podstawie argumentuje się, że rozumienie populizmu w drugiej połowie – pod koniec XX wieku nigdy nie uległo utrwaleniu, ujednoczeniu i jednostronności. Po pierwsze, populizm może charakteryzować zarówno demokratyczne, jak i niedemokratyczne (hybrydowe i autokratyczne) reżimy polityczne, co determinuje jego odmienną orientację i kierunkowość. Po drugie, populizm może być postrzegany zarówno jako zjawisko negatywne, jak i pozytywne społeczno-polityczne, choć klasycznie jest postrzegane jako zagrożenie dla demokracji. Po trzecie, populizm w swojej interpretacji zależy nie tylko od części świata, ale także od kraju, dlatego zawsze trzeba o nim myśleć w sposób zdeterminowany kontekstem. Po czwarte, populizm może być determinowany bardzo różnymi przyczynami, ale na ogół mniej społeczno-ekonomicznymi, a częściej politycznymi. Niemniej jednak populizm w drugiej połowie XX wieku zaczął generalnie podlegać projektowaniu i typologii doktrynalnej opartej na połączeniu kilku podstawowych parametrów i kryteriów, które tradycyjnie sprowadzają się do konfrontacji i mobilizacji walki między „ludem” i „oligarchią”/”elitą”.

Słowa kluczowe: polityka, demokracja, populizm, dyskurs polityczny, władza, ludzie, elita, partia, proces polityczny.

БАЗОВІ ПАРАМЕТРИ, ВИЯВИ Й ОПЦІЇ КОНЦЕПТУАЛІЗАЦІЇ ТА ПРАКТИКИ ПОПУЛІЗМУ В СВІТІ НАПРИКІНЦІ ХХ СТОЛІТТЯ

У статті проаналізовано опорні параметри, вияви та опції концептуалізації і практики популізму у світі, зокрема в його різних частинах і загалом, в другій половині – наприкінці ХХ століття. Констатовано, що популізм із середини ХХ століття почав урізноманітнюватись, але водночас і теоретизуватись та набувати доктринальних обрисів. Виявом цього стало те, що концептуалізація й емпірика популізму почали набувати ознак тенденційних і повторювальних. Враховуючи це, сутність популізму в динаміці другої половини ХХ століття проаналізовано на прикладі країн Європи та Північної і Південної Америки тощо. На цій підставі аргументовано, що розуміння популізму в другій половині – в кінці ХХ століття так і не стало консолідованим, уніфікованим й одностороннім. По-перше, популізм може бути властивий і для демократичних, і для недемократичних (гібридних й автократичних) політичних режимів, що зумовлює його різну спрямованість та векторність. По-друге, популізм можна сприймати і як негативне, і як позитивне суспільно-політичне явище, хоча класично він типово сприймається як загроза демократії. По-третє, популізм у його трактуванні залежить не тільки від частини світу, а й від країни, а тому про нього завжди треба розмірковувати контекст-детерміновано. По-четверте, популізм може зумовлюватись дуже різними причинами,

але загалом рідше соціально-економічними, а частіше політичними. Тим не менше, популізм у другій половині ХХ століття загалом почали піддавати доктринальному оформленню і типологізації на підставі комбінування кількох базових параметрів та критеріїв, які традиційно зводяться до протистояння і мобілізації боротьби між «народом» та «олігархією»/«елітою».

Ключові слова: політика, демократія, популізм, політичний дискурс, влада, народ, еліта, партія, політичний процес.

Populism has long been the shape of political theorizing and political practice in almost every country in the world. Moreover, such a statement is considered relevant both currently and in retrospect, after all, according to the scientific achievements and peculiarities of real politics, this phenomenon is increasingly being resorted to causing the populism to be diversified and has been resorted to historically, including in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Accordingly, the state of conceptualization of populism in political science is considered to be quite developed, albeit such, that is inevitably constantly intensifying. However, at a certain stage of development of political thought / theory and political practice, there arose certain circumstances, on the basis of which the conceptualization and empiricism of populism started to acquire tendencies of a trend or recurrence. This puts on the agenda the need to streamline the themes of classical parameters, manifestations and even options for conceptualization and practice of populism in the world (in its various parts and regions), which became apparent no earlier than the second half - late 20th century.

The stated issues are developed in a number of scientific and ideological works and works that focus on the phenomenon of political populism or populism in politics. The authors of these publications are both scholars and politicians, due to whom populism in a certain period of its development, but not before the second half of the 20th century, was even outlined as a doctrinal or group category, brought into a certain conceptual, theoretical and political / party direction. Among them, in particular, such well-known scholars of populism as K. Abts and S. Rummens¹, D. Albertazzi and D. McDonell², I. Berlin, R. Hofstadter and D. McRae³, H.-G. Betz⁴, S. Bornschieer⁵, M. Canovan⁶, M. Conniff⁷, T. Cowen⁸, C. De la Torre⁹, T. Di

¹ Abts K., Rummens S., Populism versus Democracy, „*Political Studies*“ 2007, vol 55, nr. 2, s. 405-424.

² Albertazzi D., McDonell D., *Twenty-first Century Populism*, Wyd. Palgrave Macmillan 2007.

³ Berlin I., Hofstadter R., McRae D., To define populism, „*Government and Opposition*“ 1968, vol 3, s. 137-179.

⁴ Betz H.-G., *Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe*, Wyd. Macmillan 1994.

⁵ Bornschieer S., *Cleavage Politics and the Populist Right: The New Cultural Conflict in Western Europe*, Wyd. Temple University Press 2010.

⁶ Canovan M., *Populism*, Wyd. Junction Books 1981.; Canovan M., *The People*, Wyd. Polity Press 2005.; Canovan M., Trust the People! Populism and the Two Faces of Democracy, „*Political Studies*“ 1999, vol 47, nr. 1, s. 2-16.

⁷ Conniff M., *Latin American Populism in Comparative Perspective*, Wyd. University of New Mexico Press 1982.; Conniff M., *Populism in Latin America*, Wyd. University of Alabama Press 1999.

⁸ Cowen T., *Feisty, Protectionist Populism? New Zealand Tried That*, Wyd. Bloomberg L.P. (13 February 2017).

⁹ De la Torre C., Populism and Democracy: Political Discourses and Cultures in Contemporary Ecuador, „*Latin American Perspectives*“ 1997, vol 24, nr. 3, s. 12-24.

Tella¹⁰, W. Galston¹¹, G. Germani¹², K. Hawkins¹³, G. Ionescu and E. Gellner¹⁴, C. Kaltwasser, P. Taggart, P. Espejo and P. Ostiguy¹⁵, M. Kazin¹⁶, A. Knight¹⁷, E. Laclau¹⁸, R. Lowitt¹⁹, K. Luther²⁰, J. Mansbridge and S. Macedo²¹, Y. Mény and Y. Surel²², C. Mudde and C. Kaltwasser²³, K. Priester²⁴, K. Roberts²⁵, B. Stanley²⁶, P. Taguieff²⁷, N. Urbinati²⁸, S. Van Kessel, T. Bale and P. Taggart²⁹, A. Van Niekerk³⁰, K. Weyland³¹ and many others, even if they represent modern (since the beginning of the 21st century) political science.

Although, on the contrary, the staging of this theme certainly took place, thanks in part to the earliest reflections on populism within the dichotomous logic of confrontation along the lines of “people” – “political elite / dominant ideology”³², which were developed before the middle – 1960s of the 20th century, in particular by authors such as J. Allcock³³, J. Hicks³⁴, S. Lipset³⁵, R. Pipes³⁶ and some others. Therefore, given that there are many representatives and researchers of populism in this context, their ideas need to be structured, organized and systematized to develop a holistic view of the classical parameters, manifestations and options of conceptualization and practice of populism in the world in the second half of the 20th century,

¹⁰ Di Tella T., Populism into the Twenty-first Century, „*Government and Opposition*“ 1997, vol 32, nr. 2, s. 187-200.

¹¹ Galston W., The Populist Challenge to Liberal Democracy, „*Journal of Democracy*“ 2018, vol 29, nr. 2, s. 5-19.

¹² Germani G., *Authoritarianism, Fascism and National Populism*, Wyd. Transaction Books 1978.

¹³ Hawkins K., Populism in Venezuela: The Rise of Chavismo, „*Third World Quarterly*“ 2003, vol 24, nr. 6, s. 1137-1160.; Hawkins K., *Venezuelas Chavismo and Populism in Comparative Perspective*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 2010.

¹⁴ Ionescu G., Gellner E., *Populism. Its Meanings and National Characteristics*, Wyd. Weidenfeld 1969.

¹⁵ Kaltwasser C., Taggart P., Espejo P., Ostiguy P. *The Oxford Handbook of Populism*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2017.; Taggart P., *Populism*, Wyd. Open University Press 2000.

¹⁶ Kazin M., *The Populist Persuasion*, Wyd. Cornell University Press 1995.

¹⁷ Knight A., Populism and Neo-populism in Latin America, especially Mexico, „*Journal of Latin American Studies*“ 1998, vol 30, nr. 2, s. 223-248.

¹⁸ Laclau E., *On Populist Reason*, Wyd. Verso 2007.

¹⁹ Lowitt R., *Fred Harris: his journey from liberalism to populism*, Wyd. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers 2002.

²⁰ Luther K., Austria: A Democracy under Threat from the Freedom Party?, „*Parliamentary Affairs*“ 2000, vol 53, nr. 3, s. 426-442.

²¹ Mansbridge J., Macedo S., Populism and Democratic Theory, „*Annual Review of Law and Social Science*“ 2019, vol 15, nr. 1, s. 59-77.

²² Mény Y., Surel Y., *Democracies and the Populist Challenge*, Wyd. Palgrave 2002.

²³ Mudde C., The Populist Zeitgeist, „*Government and Opposition*“ 2004, vol 39, nr. 4, s. 541-563.; Mudde C., *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 2009.; Mudde C., Kaltwasser C., *Populism: A Very Short Introduction*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2017.

²⁴ Priester K., *Populismus. Historische und aktuelle Erscheinungsformen*, Wyd. Campus Verlag 2007.

²⁵ Roberts K., Neoliberalism and the Transformation of Populism in Latin America, „*World Politics*“ 1995, vol 48, nr. 1, s. 82-116.

²⁶ Stanley B., The Thin Ideology of Populism, „*Journal of Political Ideologies*“ 2008, vol 13, nr. 1, s. 95-110.

²⁷ Taguieff P., *L'illusion populiste. Essai sur les démagogues de l'âge démocratique*, Wyd. Flammarion 2007.; Taguieff P., Political Science Confronts Populism: From a Conceptual Mirage to a Real Problem, „*Telos*“ 1995, vol 103, s. 9-43.

²⁸ Urbinati N., Democracy and Populism, „*Constellations*“ 1998, vol 5, nr. 1, s. 110-124.

²⁹ Van Kessel S., Bale T., Taggart P., Thrown with abandon? Popular understanding of populism as conveyed by the print media: a UK case study, „*Acta Politica*“ 2011, vol 46, s. 111-131.

³⁰ Van Niekerk A., *Populism and political development in Latin America*, Wyd. Rotterdam University Press 1974.

³¹ Weyland K., Clarifying a Contested Concept: Populism in the Study of Latin American Politics, „*Comparative Politics*“ 2001, vol 34, nr. 1, s. 1-22.; Weyland K., Neoliberal Populism in Latin America and Eastern Europe, „*Comparative Politics*“ 1999, vol 31, nr. 4, s. 379-401.

³² Laclau E., *Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory*, Wyd. New Left Books 1977, s. 165, 173.

³³ Allcock J., Populism: A Brief Biography, „*Sociology*“ 1971, vol 5, nr. 3, s. 371-387.

³⁴ Hicks J., *The Populist Revolt. A History of Farmers' Alliance and the People's Party*, Wyd. Greenwood Press 1931.

³⁵ Lipset S., *Political Man. The Social Bases of Politics*, Wyd. Heinemann 1960.

³⁶ Pipes R., Narodnichstvo: A Semantic Inquiry, „*Slavic Review*“ 1964, vol 23, nr. 3, s. 441-458.; Pipes R., *Russia under the Old Regime*, Wyd. Weidenfeld and Nicolson 1974.

even at the beginning of the 21st century. Although the last period requires a separate scientific study, the expected results of our research may be useful at least in part, at least historiographically, since many modern researchers appeal to the topic of populism in retrospect.

Thus, as early as the 1960s and 1970s, it was well known that populism was “elitist” (when it was largely a means of gaining and retaining power) and “popular” (when it was a means of changing power and improving status, condition, and rights of society)³⁷, and that populism can promote pluralism and democratization in autocratic political regimes or the risks of declining democracy in the case of democratic political regimes, etc.³⁸. In other words, it was clear that populism needed to be context-sensitive³⁹.

This was mentioned during a number of seminars, colloquia and conferences on populism in the political process and political discourse, as well as a whole array of already classic publications (the authors of which were listed, including, the above mentioned ones, but first of all such authors as I. Berlin, R. Hofstadter and D. McRae⁴⁰, M. Canovan⁴¹, T. Di Tella⁴², G. Ionescu and E. Gellner⁴³), which highlighted the classical parameters, manifestations and options of conceptualization and practice of populism in the world (as of the time when such ideas were presented). Such worldview logic and reflection proved to be extremely important, as the outlined positioning of populism undoubtedly influenced its further development, conceptualization and transformation into a certain doctrinal direction, in particular on the example of the ideas and activities of such populist politicians and political forces as H. D. Perón and K. Menem in Argentina, J. Vargas and F. K. de Mello in Brazil, the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement in Bolivia, L. Cardenas in Mexico, V.R. H. de la Torre and A. Fujimori in Peru, “Democratic Action” in Venezuela, H. Ibarra in Ecuador, J. Rawlings in Ghana, T. Sankara in Burkina Faso, G.A. Nasser in Egypt, M. Gaddafi in Libya, F. Harris, J. Wallis, J. Carter, R. Whitaker, F. Harris and the American National Progressive Republican League in the United States, R. Muldoon in New Zealand, the “Flemish Bloc,” “Flemish Interest” in Belgium, the “National Front” in France and many others (some of them will be analyzed in more detail). Although this trend in itself has never been and ultimately could not become consolidated and completely unidirectional, after all, it was determined and defined by several groups of political practice, and therefore the political theorizing of populism, on which attention will actually be partly focused further.

One of the main features of the theorizing of populism in the second half of the twentieth century is, inter alia, that it began to be considered in a very broad context, rather than as it was before. The fact is that populism was previously thought of mainly in terms of European political geography, but since the 1970s, the 1980s, of the 20th century populism became a phenomenon common to the European region and other

³⁷ Laclau E., *Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory*, Wyd. New Left Books 1977, s. 173.

³⁸ Di Tella T., Populism into the Twenty-first Century, „*Government and Opposition*” 1997, vol 32, nr. 2, s. 200.; Hennessy A., *Latin America*, [w:] Ionescu G., Gellner E. (eds.), *Populism. Its Meanings and National Characteristics*, Wyd. Weidenfeld 1969, s. 29.

³⁹ Berlin I., Hofstadter R., McRae D., To define populism, „*Government and Opposition*” 1968, vol 3, s. 176-177.; Canovan M., *Populism*, Wyd. Junction Books 1981, s. 172.

⁴⁰ Berlin I., Hofstadter R., McRae D., To define populism, „*Government and Opposition*” 1968, vol 3, s. 137-179.

⁴¹ Canovan M., *Populism*, Wyd. Junction Books 1981.

⁴² Di Tella T., Populism into the Twenty-first Century, „*Government and Opposition*” 1997, vol 32, nr. 2, s. 187-200.

⁴³ Ionescu G., Gellner E., *Populism. Its Meanings and National Characteristics*, Wyd. Weidenfeld 1969.

parts of the world, including Latin America, Asia, Africa, etc. However, this revealed a kind of paradox of the development and conceptualization of populism in its classical perception (as evidenced by political history), since at this time populism began to be considered much more widely than before, in particular in worldview and doctrine, and in the context of political practice and differences from the already established ideologies of political parties, which actually concerned primarily European countries.

This is evidenced by the fact that populism in Europe at the turn of the 70-80s of the twentieth century was understood, for example, on the one hand, the characteristics of right-wing political movements (such as Pujadism, inspired by P. Pujad), as well as, on the other hand, practical and political rhetoric, program and positioning of right / far right political parties and figures, including against the background of established ideologies and parties. It is on this basis that the term “populism” entered a situation when it began to denote and define the direction and components of socio-political debates in a country, although until recently it meant almost nothing, since it was empty in its practical meaning political and party-electoral content⁴⁴. Another feature of this process on the example of European countries was that as soon as the phenomenon of populism came into political and doctrinal use, it began to develop and differentiate very quickly, after all, many theorists and political practitioners began to appeal to him, considering it convenient and quite encouraging in terms of the expected party-electoral and political advantages in the future.

Based on this, already in the 80-90s of the 20th century, populism began to play a practical and pragmatic (goal-oriented) role in the European political process and political debate, but above all in its “negative” perception that is, as a means of changing power and improving the status, condition and rights of society. A manifestation of this was the fact that populists were once called such well-known politicians as M. Thatcher in the United Kingdom or R. Reagan in the United States, who appealed to “popular feelings and prejudices”⁴⁵, and the phenomenon of populism began to be perceived as a challenge a time of liberal inevitability and triumphalism of the Western world⁴⁶. At the same time, the European option for interpreting populism was to realize it as the rhetoric of right-wing and far-right politicians and political forces, such as J. Haider and the “Austrian Freedom Party” in Austria, Le Pen and the “National Front” in France, W. Bossi and the “Northern League” in Italy, K. Blocher and the Swiss People’s Party in Switzerland, K. Hagen and the “Progress Party” in Norway, F. De Vinter and “Flemish Interest” in Belgium, P. Portash and the People’s Party in Portugal, P. Kiersgor and the Danish People’s Party in Denmark, etc., however, not because they have a rather specific political style (although sometimes because of it), but mainly because they work and address within the specific discourse of the “people”. This reveals the main logic of the difference between Western European populism of the second half of the 20th century from populism in almost all other

⁴⁴ Taguieff P., *L'illusion populiste. Essai sur les démagogies de l'âge démocratique*, Wyd. Flammarion 2007, s. 122.

⁴⁵ Di Tella T., Populism into the Twenty-first Century, „*Government and Opposition*” 1997, vol 32, nr. 2, s. 188.

⁴⁶ Luther K., Austria: A Democracy under Threat from the Freedom Party?, „*Parliamentary Affairs*” 2000, vol 53, s. 426, 433.

parts of the world, for in the former ones the “people” are not necessarily poor and destitute, which cannot be said of the latter ones.

Instead, the focus of understanding the “people” in Western European populism in the second half of the twentieth century was its identification with the “populace” and ordinary people fighting corruption, elitism, emigrants, etc.⁴⁷.

The situation is somewhat different, although largely inherited from Western Europe, in other European countries, in particular in Southern, Central and Eastern and Eastern Europe. Thus, in the countries of Southern Europe, the term “populism” is mostly used to discredit some politicians and political parties of others, i.e. their opponents, and not necessarily right-wing or far-right directions. However, for the countries of the region, particularly Greece, populism in the late 20th century was both political and doctrinal, particularly when it concerned (and frequently still does) a party such as “PASOK” or the All-Greek Socialist Movement with A. Papandreou (today the party leader is another person). After all, this political force is not right or ultra-right at all, but instead socialist or social-democratic and defends the ideology of the “third way”, according to which it defends the “ideal” of heterogeneous nonprivilege and “people’s struggle against political elite”⁴⁸.

The expansion of the paradigm and understanding of populism in Europe took place in the early 1990s. It was demonstrated by the fact that this phenomenon began to be discussed not only in the context of right-wing or far-right politicians and political forces, but also with regard to various measures and instruments of demagoguery that have started to be applied by some European politicians, such as S. Berlusconi in Italy, B. Tapin in France, P. Fortein in the Netherlands and others. An interesting feature is that populism, even in the party context, came to be understood as an appeal to the “people” through the media, not party structures, which led to the formation of a kind of anti-party and even anti-establishment discourse of “populism”. Accordingly, in addition to defining populism as a programmatic focus of some right-wing and far-right parties, it has come to be seen in Europe as a measure to condemn certain systemic political elites, and frequently entire party and even political systems, in particular through demagogic and spectacular appeals to “simple” political decisions and unfulfilled emotional promises of politicians⁴⁹.

However, at the same time, populism began to concern not only the anti-establishment discourse of individual politicians and political forces, but also the rhetoric and some positions of mainstream / systemic political parties, including their appeal to “comprehensiveness” as expression and involvement of “people” in politics⁵⁰.

⁴⁷ Taguieff P., *L'illusion populiste. Essai sur les démagogies de l'âge démocratique*, Wyd. Flammarion 2007, s. 137.

⁴⁸ Lyrintzis C., *PASOK in power: the loss of the “third road to socialism”*, [w:] Gallagher T., Williams A. (eds.), *Southern European Socialism: Parties, elections and the challenge of government*, Wyd. Manchester University Press 1989, s. 38.

⁴⁹ Mény Y., Surel Y., *Democracies and the Populist Challenge*, Wyd. Palgrave 2002, s. 131.; Taguieff P., *Political Science Confronts Populism: From a Conceptual Mirage to a Real Problem*, „*Telos*” 1995, vol 103, s. 42.

⁵⁰ Mudde C., *The Populist Zeitgeist*, „*Government and Opposition*” 2004, vol 39, nr. 4, s. 550.; Canovan M., *The People*, Wyd. Polity Press 2005, s. 77-78.; Mény Y., Surel Y., *Democracies and the Populist Challenge*, Wyd. Palgrave 2002, s. 87, 139

Perhaps the main reason for this was a very significant weakening of the importance, ideological orientation and organizational structure of traditional European parties, including due to the emergence and dissemination of various issues and problems mainly post-materialist content and nature. In other words, almost all political parties in Europe became more populist and all-encompassing when voters began to vote not so much for their programs (as they used to) as for their political leaders (for example, J. Chirac in France and T. Blair in the United Kingdom), what actually became the norm or at least the practice of personalizing politics in the 90s of the 20th century⁵¹. It follows that populism in the late 20th century, at least in a number of European countries, became a symptom of the construction of parties to the background or margins, as a result of which government began to become very comprehensive, undifferentiated and focused on "everyone's interests"⁵². As a result, the theorizing of European populism, at least in political discourse and the media, in the late twentieth century began to become negatively oriented⁵³. Perhaps the main reason for this was that the adjective "populist" started to be associated with the attribute of irresponsibility of power⁵⁴, and sometimes even with the denial of the logic and progress of globalization in the modern world by some politicians and political forces⁵⁵. However, in contrast, those politicians and political parties that were frequently called populist were more satisfied with this, as they appealed to their closeness to the electorate and the "people".

Another situation is historically different with regard to the understanding of the phenomenon of populism in Russia at the end of the 20th century, which in this context did not even completely follow the pan-European or Eastern European logic and differed significantly from most other post-communist European countries, although to some extent it approached the specifics and options of populism in some countries of Southern Europe. The brightest populists in this country, at least according to the media and political theorists⁵⁶, as well as style of behavior and discourse, in the late 90's of the 20th century were then President Boris Yeltsin and leader of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia Vladimir Zhirinovskiy.

At the same time, populism in Russia and some other Eastern European contexts was also perceived as the result of the electoral success of some politicians at the dawn of the independence of the new post-Soviet states, especially given that they were opposed by former communist elites, who actually discredited the "new" political leaders. Accordingly, it was populism in this sense that frequently approached conditional nationalism in its spirit, as it typically reflected the opposition of the leaders of certain nations to the spirit of supranational

⁵¹ Mény Y., Surel Y., *Democracies and the Populist Challenge*, Wyd. Palgrave 2002, s. 150.

⁵² I Canovan M., *The People*, Wyd. Polity Press 2005, s. 78.; Mény Y., Surel Y., *Democracies and the Populist Challenge*, Wyd. Palgrave 2002, s. 96.

⁵³ Van Kessel S., Bale T., Taggart P., Thrown with abandon? Popular understanding of populism as conveyed by the print media: a UK case study, „*Acta Politica*“ 2011, vol 46, s. 115.

⁵⁴ Di Tella T., Populism into the Twenty-first Century, „*Government and Opposition*“ 1997, vol 32, nr. 2, s. 188.

⁵⁵ Mény Y., Surel Y., *Democracies and the Populist Challenge*, Wyd. Palgrave 2002, s. 217.

⁵⁶ Taguieff P., *L'illusion populiste. Essai sur les démagogies de l'âge démocratique*, Wyd. Flammarion 2007, s. 138-140.

elites. But perhaps the main specificity of Russia was that the term “populism” was used to denote such politicians, and not the term “populism” inherent in the populist style of behavior and appeal to the masses (in this sense as an attempt to save people’s history and culture)⁵⁷, which was at least inherent in this country in retrospect. A similar logic frequently worked in other post-Soviet countries, as well as in countries that were politically close to Russia or situationally through individual political leaders inherited the legacy of the communist past, particularly in Poland in the case of L. Walesa, A. Lepper and A. Kwasniewski, in Serbia in the case of S. Milosevic and V. Seselj, in Ukraine in the case of L. Kuchma, in Hungary in the case of I. Churka and J. Torgyan, in Slovakia in the case of V. Mechiar, in Azerbaijan in the case of G. Aliyev, etc. Thus, populism in this context, as in Western Europe, was perceived, at least by theorists of political science and political discourse, mostly negatively and anti-systemically by the former government, former political elites, etc. and regardless of the consequences of populism – either democratization or autocratization.

In contrast, the logic of interpreting populism in the second half of the 20th century was completely or at least partially different in the United States, where the understanding of populism was largely less negative than in European countries, after all populism in this part of the world has proved to be quite popular and representative, rather than exceptional and degrading in political discourse and theorizing. A convenient trend in this interpretation of populism was set by US President J. Carter, who used the term “populism” to express a kind of honor on the basis of or in opposition to the classical political division between the “Republican Party” and the “Democratic Party” in the United States, after all due to this, the appeal was made to the importance of the “people” in American politics. Thus, according to some researchers, populism began to be perceived as a kind of regime or option of persuasion and finding common ground between the two extremes of American party policy or as a kind of synthesis of them primarily for the interests of the nation and “people”⁵⁸.

Following this logic, it is populism that helps to improve the breadth and range of positions of American parties among themselves, as it focuses on a certain middle position and the involvement of additional / new social groups in the democratic and mediatory political process. Nevertheless, American discourse has a slightly different understanding of populism, in particular as a popular or direct style of expressing one’s opinion by certain politicians, especially if it differs from the position of political elites⁵⁹. However, populism in the United States, at least in this context, is positioned as anti-government or anti-establishment, but it is not at all anti-systemic or anti-establishment, as it may be in European countries⁶⁰. Thus, in general, American populism or American-style populism plays an important role both in political creation in

⁵⁷ FallaP, *The Oxford Russian Dictionary*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1993, s. 1064.; TaguieffP., *L'illusion populiste. Essai sur les démagogies de l'âge démocratique*, Wyd. Flammarion 2007, s. 141-145.

⁵⁸ Kazin M., *The Populist Persuasion*, Wyd. Cornell University Press 1995, s. 3, 4.

⁵⁹ Urbinati N., Democracy and Populism, „*Constellations*” 1998, vol 5, nr. 1, s. 111.

⁶⁰ Mény Y., Surel Y., *Democracies and the Populist Challenge*, Wyd. Palgrave 2002, s. 110.

general and in establishing or restoring balance and the distribution of political power in the interests of socio-political groups and voters, although primarily within the framework of the majority principle⁶¹. In general, this means that populism is typically pluralistic and “positive” in the United States and mobilization and “negative” in European countries⁶².

Quite average logic, in this context, was used at one time, in particular until the middle of the 20th century, for example, in Australia, Canada and New Zealand, where populism served both to mediate and to mobilize socio-political groups and the electorate. However, at the turn of the 1980s and 1990s, populism in this country began to be thought of more as a mobilization phenomenon with negative and sometimes even anti-systemic content and content. The fact is that the pro-populist biases of some politicians and political forces began to be thought of as certain labels with a humiliating content. In addition, the term “populism” has come to refer to certain reactionary political parties, in particular, as in Western Europe, radical or extremist right-wing political forces⁶³.

Quite or partially contrary to this, the meaning and logic of populism was formed and formalized in Latin America in the second half of the twentieth century, because populism in this region matured not so much on a democratic as on an autocratic basis unlike all other parts and regions of the world analyzed above. The fact is that populism in Latin America has matured not so much for political as for social and economic reasons and factors, as well as for different approaches to interpreting the essence and content of democracy and ways to achieve it in the future (as options for transit from autocracies in the region).

Whereas in most countries in the region that have appealed for such an explanation of populism, the process of transition from autocracies to democracies or at least hybrid regimes – and electoral democracies in general – took place mainly before the 1980s and 1990s, then they either stopped talking about the phenomenon of populism or began to use it in other senses and contexts. However, the “death” of populism⁶⁴ announced by some researchers did not take place in Latin America at all, as it was reborn and transformed, including paradigmatically and doctrinally. Moreover in the 80s and 90s of the 20th century conceptual debates and reflections on a renewed understanding of populism in the region began. In practical terms, this was a very relevant position, as populists began to be called politicians such as A. Fujimori in Peru, F. Collor in Brazil, K. Menem in Argentina and many others. But the biggest paradox was that the term “populism” itself began to transform, but now from its socio-economic content to its political content, as is the case in other parts of the world. Even more, the doctrinal politicians were considered populists at least for appealing to the principles of political and economic neoliberalism in their countries to replace socialism and socially oriented development

⁶¹ Kazin M., *The Populist Persuasion*, Wyd. Cornell University Press 1995, s. 7.

⁶² Betz H.-G., *Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe*, Wyd. Macmillan 1994, s. 38.; Mény Y., Sured Y., *Democracies and the Populist Challenge*, Wyd. Palgrave 2002, s. 198-199.

⁶³ Betz H.-G., *Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe*, Wyd. Macmillan 1994, s. 4.

⁶⁴ Conniff M., *Latin American Populism in Comparative Perspective*, Wyd. University of New Mexico Press 1982, s. 217.

models that have been quite popular in the region at the time and before. Thus, something new was populist, which contradicted the generally accepted logic and model of political and socio-economic development from the previous stage of history⁶⁵. More specifically, populism or neo-populism was neoliberalism, which opposed the principles and achievements of classical populism in Latin America, in particular because the latter one defended the idea and logic of expansionism and distribution policy⁶⁶.

In general, the situation regarding the understanding and doctrinal content of populism in the late 20th century reached the point when this phenomenon began to be described as anti-systemic in the development of liberal democracy in the world. In other words, the content of populism, with the exception of the United States, has become more and more negative, as it has been associated with the “crisis”, “erosion” or “dangers” of democracy in the world as a whole and in individual countries⁶⁷. In a somewhat weakened sense, populism has been permanently interpreted as a challenge and a change in procedural democracy, even though populism is based on the idea of the “people” and its protection and representation.

The explanation of some researchers frequently comes down to the fact that populism should be thought of as a distortion of democracy in essence, after all populism combines a specific political context, liberalism (including its principle of non-interference), anarchism and conservatism, and therefore in such an “explosive” mixture, it appears as a kind of uprising against the modern understanding of the state and against the political system⁶⁸. The manifestation of this is that populism is very different from democracy, including in the perception of “folk” and the “people”, after all these categories in populism are not configured at all through solidarity with a specific group of society, instead, they are outlined as formal constructs that are in opposition to the political system and the existing and dominant ideas and principles⁶⁹. And this despite the fact, that theorists and practitioners of populism usually appeal to the “people” because of the principles of people’s sovereignty and majority⁷⁰. Given this, it was already clear at the end of the 20th century that populism doctrinally challenges the current democratic socio-political reality and systemacy⁷¹, in particular due to the perception of the “people” as a homogeneous majority that opposes or wants to oppose the political establishment and elite.

⁶⁵ Roberts K., Neoliberalism and the Transformation of Populism in Latin America, „*World Politics*“ 1995, vol 48, nr. 1, s. 106-107.; Weyland K., Neoliberal Populism in Latin America and Eastern Europe, „*Comparative Politics*“ 1999, vol 31, nr. 4, s. 379.

⁶⁶ Knight A., Populism and Neo-populism in Latin America, especially Mexico, „*Journal of Latin American Studies*“ 1998, vol 30, nr. 2, s. 2-40.

⁶⁷ Abts K., Rummens S., Populism versus Democracy, „*Political Studies*“ 2007, vol 55, nr. 2, s. 415.; Canovan M., Trust the People! Populism and the Two Faces of Democracy, „*Political Studies*“ 1999, vol 47, nr. 1, s. 2-16; Mény Y., Surel Y., *Democracies and the Populist Challenge*, Wyd. Palgrave 2002.; Albertazzi D., McDonell D., *Twenty-first Century Populism*, Wyd. Palgrave Macmillan 2007, s. 16.; Galston W., The Populist Challenge to Liberal Democracy, „*Journal of Democracy*“ 2018, vol 29, nr. 2, s. 5-19.

⁶⁸ Priester K., *Populismus. Historische und aktuelle Erscheinungsformen*, Wyd. Campus Verlag 2007, s. 48-51.

⁶⁹ Canovan M., Trust the People! Populism and the Two Faces of Democracy, „*Political Studies*“ 1999, vol 47, nr. 1, s. 3.

⁷⁰ Mény Y., Surel Y., *Democracies and the Populist Challenge*, Wyd. Palgrave 2002, s. 25.

⁷¹ Mudde C., The Populist Zeitgeist, „*Government and Opposition*“ 2004, vol 39, nr. 4, s. 543.; Mudde C., *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 2009, s. 23; Albertazzi D., McDonell D., *Twenty-first Century Populism*, Wyd. Palgrave Macmillan 2007, s. 3; Abts K., Rummens S., Populism versus Democracy, „*Political Studies*“ 2007, vol 55, nr. 2, s. 420.; Stanley B., The Thin Ideology of Populism, „*Journal of Political Ideologies*“ 2008, vol 13, nr. 1, s. 100.

Although, in an even stronger version, populism even appeals not only to anti-systemicism, but also to anti-partisanship, which various politicians frequently try to educate in their supporters⁷². On the other hand, this logic did not immediately become basic in Latin America, where a kind of “classical” populism was initially more positively assessed, as it aimed to establish or test different models and options of democracy, instead, later in the format of “neo-populism” it became largely negatively determined, which was facilitated by the greater democratization of the countries in which it began to take place.

As a result, as early as the 1990s, political science argued that populism should be described as a multidimensional phenomenon composed of several basic characteristics that describe the various competing perspectives and options of populism, including: personalistic and paternalistic leadership; heterogeneous, dissimilar and multi-class logic of coalition in the political procession; a downward process of political mobilization that bypasses institutionalized forms of political representation; amorphous or eclectic ideology, the use of economic projects of constructs of distributive justice and methods of clientelism⁷³. The synthesis of these attributes leads researchers to the flexible conclusion that those politicians who are populists can focus on very different parameters of populism as a phenomenon and doctrine. In other words, within the framework of populism as an idea, there can be distinguished several options of populism as a practice including depending on the parameters by which populism can be defined as such. In addition, this means that populism as a political phenomenon can be easily and variously superimposed on different political contexts and various political forces within certain contexts and even ideologies, what gives good grounds to typify populism in various ways, including through the prism of inter-party competition in certain political systems. And it follows that ideologically populism does not have to be right-wing or far-right⁷⁴, after all it can be left-wing or far-left, and even centrist, etc., the main thing is that one type or another fulfilled the parameters of populism as a common denominator. And this even regardless of whether populism as such in a particular region is understood positively or negatively in a particular type of political regime – democratic or autocratic – but mainly depending on the logic and postulate of confrontation “political elite” and ideas of the “people”. After all, fundamental in the understanding of populism, as noted in the second half of the 20th century, was its interpretation as a political style that radicalizes and mobilizes the struggle between “people” / “folk” and “oligarchy” / “elite”.

As a result, the study found that the understanding of populism in the second half - late 20th century has not become consolidated, unified and one-sided. On the one hand, this

⁷² Taguieff P., *Political Science Confronts Populism: From a Conceptual Mirage to a Real Problem*, „*Telos*“ 1995, vol 103, s. 32, 34; Albertazzi D., McDonell D., *Twenty-first Century Populism*, Wyd. Palgrave Macmillan 2007, s. 21.

⁷³ Roberts K., *Neoliberalism and the Transformation of Populism in Latin America*, „*World Politics*“ 1995, vol 48, nr. 1, s. 88.

⁷⁴ Bornschieer S., *Cleavage Politics and the Populist Right: The New Cultural Conflict in Western Europe*, Wyd. Temple University Press 2010, s. 3; Mudde C., *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 2009, s. 13, 26.

phenomenon is characteristic of both democratic and non-democratic (hybrid and autocratic) political regimes, which determines its orientation and vector. On the other hand, populism can be perceived as both a negative and a positive socio-political phenomenon, although today populism is typically perceived negatively, in particular as a threat to democracy. On the third side, the interpretation of populism differs not only from part to part of the world, but also from country to country, and therefore it is always necessary to think about it in a context determined. On the fourth side, the causes of populism can be both political and socio-economic factors. However, in modern political science it is argued that populism is still doctrinal on the basis of a combination of several basic parameters and criteria. However, they not only allow singling it out, but also on the basis of differences to typologize it, both theoretically and practically politically.

Therefore, populism should not be interpreted as something holistic and unified, but instead should be perceived as a heterogeneous phenomenon that outlines ideas, style of behavior, and discourse options, and the way of political behavior and strategy of actors and parties in the political process, although synthetically or generalized populism is determined by the confrontation and mobilization of the struggle between “people” / “folk” and “oligarchy” / “elite”. In contrast, this provides at least some basis for arguing that populism in general is inherent in politics and the political process, after all virtually all politics that appeal to the “people” construct is or may be “populist”.

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